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Abstrat
This paper haraterizes the top trading yles mehanism for the shool hoie problem.
Shools may have multiple available seats to be assigned to students. For eah shool a strit
priority ordering of students is determined by the shool distrit. Eah student has strit pref-
erene over the shools. We rst dene weaker forms of fairness, onsisteny and resoure
monotoniity. We show that the top trading yles mehanism is the unique Pareto eient and
strategy-proof mehanism that satises the weaker forms of fairness, onsisteny and resoure
monotoniity. To our knowledge this is the rst axiomati approah to the top trading yles
mehanism in the shool hoie problem where shools have a apaity greater than one.
Key Words: Top Trading Cyles Mehanism, Shool Choie Problem
JEL Classiation: C78, D61, D78, I20
1 Introdution
In their seminal paper, Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez [2003℄ introdue the shool hoie problem. Be-
fore that paper, in some of the major ities students were assigned to publi shools via deient
mehanisms whih give high inentives to the students to misreport their true preferenes in order to
get better alloations. To eliminate the gaming, they propose two ompeting strategy-proof meh-
anisms: the Top Trading Cyle (TTC) mehanism and the Deferred Aeptane (DA) mehanism.
∗
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1
The TTC mehanism is not only strategy-proof but also Pareto eient. However, it fails to be fair
1
.
On the other hand, the DA mehanism satises fairness but fails to be Pareto eient. When the
poliy makers deided to adopt one of the two strategy-proof mehanisms, the DA mehanism was
seleted due to its better features in terms of respeting shool distrit priorities.
2
However, in 2012
New Orleans Reovery Shool Distrit beame the rst shool distrit to adopt TTC.
Adoption of the TTC by New Orleans shool distrit shows us that some shool distrits may
value eieny over fairness. If Pareto eieny and strategy-proofness are the main objetives of
the shool distrits then TTC an be onsidered one of the andidates. However, it is not the unique
Pareto eient and strategy-proof mehanism. For instane, the serial ditatorship mehanism also
satises these two axioms.
3
In this paper, we try to help the poliy makers who are willing to
adopt a Pareto eient and strategy-proof mehanism by providing the full haraterization of the
TTC mehanism. Our haraterization is based on Pareto eieny, strategy-proofness, mutual best
along with two axioms that we introdue: resoure monotoniity for top-ranked students and weak
onsisteny. We show that TTC mehanism is the unique mehanism satisfying Pareto eieny,
strategy-proofness, mutual best, weak onsisteny and resoure monotoniity for top-ranked students.
Mutual best
4
requires that a student be assigned to the shool at the top of his preferene
whenever he has the highest priority at that shool. A mehanism is resoure monotoni for top-
ranked students if the assignment of the top-ranked student for a shool is not worsened when the
number of available seats in that shool inreases. A mehanism is said to be weakly onsistent if
the removal of a set of agents with their assignments does not aet the assignments of the remaining
agents as long as eah agent is the top-ranked student for one of the assignment of the removed agent.
Mutual best, weak onsisteny and resoure monotoniity for top-ranked students are weaker
forms of fairness, onsisteny
5
and resoure monotoniity
6
, respetively. TTC mehanism does not
satisfy fairness, onsisteny and resoure monotoniity. In partiular, there does not exist a meh-
anism that is fair, strategy-proof and onsistent.
7
Moreover Pareto eieny and fairness are in-
1
Fairness is the natural ounterpart of the stability in the shool hoie ontext [Balinski and Sönmez, 1999℄. An
alloation is fair if there does not exist a student who prefers another shool to his assignment and that shool admitted
a student with lower priority.
2
Shool distrits in Boston, New York City and Denver have adopted versions of the DA mehanism.
3
Pyia and Ünver [2011b℄ provide a lass of mehanisms satisfying strategy-proofness and Pareto eieny in the
shool hoie problem.
4
Morrill [2012℄ uses the same axiom in the haraterization of TTC in a shool hoie problem where eah shool
has only one available seat.
5
A mehanism is onsistent if whenever a set of agents are removed with their assignments then all the remaining
agents will be assigned to their initial assignment when we run the mehanism only onsidering the remaining agents
and remaining opies of the objets.
6
Resoure monotoniity requires that if the number of available objets inreases then all agents should be aeted
in the same diretion [Chun and Thomson, 1988℄.
7
Alalde and Barbera [1994℄ show that DA mehanism is the unique strategy-proof and fair mehanism but it fails
to be onsistent.
2
ompatible.
8
Therefore, we annot have a mehanism satisfying all of the axioms.
9
Kesten [2006℄
shows that TTC satises fairness, onsisteny and resoure monotoniity if the priority order satises
strong ayliity ondition. In this paper, we show that TTC is not totally unsuessful in these
three dimensions and none of the Pareto eient and strategy-proof mehanisms an perform better
than TTC in all the three dimensions.
A mehanism whih fails to satisfy mutual best, resoure monotoniity for top-ranked students and
onsisteny may not meet the demands of both students (families) and shool distrits. We onsider
mutual best as a must fairness requirement in the shool hoie ontext. For instane, most shool
distrits give highest priority at a shool to a student whose elder sibling is already attending that
shool and most of the families have preferene over keeping their hildren in the same shool [Pathak,
2011℄. Therefore, both parents and shool distrits benet from the mutually best mehanisms .
Similarly, resoure monotoniity for top-ranked students is a must resoure monotoniity requirement.
We modify this requirement in two ways. When publi goods are alloated, we should not have a
derease in the welfare of any of the agents. Otherwise, providing less and less publi goods will
be a lear solution for the poliy makers. Therefore, we restrit our attention to the mehanisms
under whih the welfare of agents weakly inreases when the number of available objets inreases.
10
We also modify the resoure monotoniity axiom by only requiring not to have a redution in the
welfare of the top-ranked student for the shool whose number of seats has inreased. Therefore any
resoure monotoni mehanism under whih welfare of the agents weakly inrease with an inrease in
the number of available objets satises resoure monotoniity for top-ranked students. Consisteny
is a desired property in the shool hoie ontext where the assignment proess for dierent types of
shools are done separately. For instane, in New York City the assignment of exam and mainstream
shools are done separately [Abdulkadiro§lu et al., 2009℄. Therefore, running a onsistent mehanism
will prevent the request of remaining agents for another run when the other agents are removed with
their assignments.
Although, mutual best and resoure monotoniity for top-ranked students axioms are enough to
prove our uniqueness result, the TTC mehanism satises stronger forms of these two axioms. TTC
respets the priority of student i for shool s if the number of students with higher priority for shool
s is less than the number of available seats in that shool. Moreover, if the poliy makers and families
are only sensitive to priority violation in the upper priority groups then TTC an be onsidered to
have a good performane in terms of respeting priorities. Under TTC mehanism, the students who
are ranked at the top q of the priority order of shool s annot be made worse o due to the inrease
in the number of available seats from q to q′.
8
Balinski and Sönmez [1999℄ show that there does not exist fair and Pareto eient mehanism.
9
Serial ditatorship mehanism satises four of them. It fails to be fair.
10
Kojima and Ünver [2010℄ dene resoure monotoniity similarly.
3
This is the rst paper haraterizing TTC mehanism in the shool hoie ontext where eah
shool may have more than one available seat. Abdulkadiro§lu and Che [2010℄ and Morrill [2012℄ pro-
vide alternative haraterizations of TTC mehanism in the shool hoie ontext where eah shool
is restrited to have only one available seat. Abdulkadiroglu and Che show that TTC mehanism is
the only mehanism that is Pareto eient, strategy-proof and reursively respets top priorities.
11
Morill haraterizes the TTC mehanism in two dierent ways. He rst shows that TTC is the
unique mehanism whih is strategy-proof, Pareto eient, and independent of irrelevant rankings
12
and satises mutual best. He also demonstrates that TTC is the unique mehanism satisfying Pareto
eieny, independene of irrelevant rankings, weak Maskin monotoniity and mutual best. Results
of these two papers do not hold in the shool hoie problem where shools may have more than
one available seat [Morrill, 2012℄. Sönmez and Ünver [2010℄ provide the haraterization of the you
request my house-I get your turn (YRMH-IGYT) mehanisms in the house alloation problems with
existing tenants [Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez, 1999℄. They show that YRMH-IGYT mehanism is
the unique mehanism satisfying Pareto eieny, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, weak
neutrality
13
and onsisteny.
14
Pyia and Ünver [2011a℄ introdue a lass of mehanism alled trad-
ing yles mehanisms and show that in the house alloation problem a mehanism is individually
rational, Pareto eient, group strategy-proof if an only if it is a trading yles mehanism.
15
Pyia
and Ünver [2011b℄ also analyze trading yles mehanism in the shool hoie environment where
eah shool may have more than one available seat and show that trading yles mehanisms are
Pareto eient and strategy-proof.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Setion 2 we introdue the model and properties
of mehanisms. In Setion 3 we desribe the TTC mehanism. We present our main results in Setion
4. In Setion 5 we show the independene of axioms used in our main results. A brief onlusion is
given in the nal setion.
2 Model
A shool hoie problem is a list [I, S, q, P,≻] where
• I is the set of students,
11
A mehanism respets top priorities if an agent is assigned an objet, then the agent that is top-ranked by that
objet should not be assigned to a worse objet than that objet.
12
A mehanism is independent of irrelevant rankings if whenever the ranking of an agent at an objet's priority
order does not aet the assignment of that agent then it does not aet the assignment of all the other agents.
13
If a mehanism satises weak neutrality then the outome of that mehanism will not depend on the names of the
unoupied objets.
14
Sönmez and Ünver [2010℄ also onsider a weaker version of onsisteny in the house alloation problem with
existing tenants.
15
The TTC mehanism belongs to the lass of the trading yles mehanisms.
4
• S is the set of shools,
• q = (qs)s∈S is the quota vetor where qs is the number of available seats in shool s,
• P = (Pi)i∈I is the preferene prole where Pi is the strit preferene of student i over the
shools inluding no-shool option,
• ≻= (≻s)s∈S is the priority prole where ≻s is the priority relation of shool s over I.
We denote the no-shool option with s∅ and qs∅ = ∞. Let Ri be the at-least-as-good-as relation
assoiated with the strit preferene order Pi and for all s, s
′ ∈ S ∪ s∅ sRis
′
if and only if s = s′ or
sPis
′
. We assume that there are no ties in the priority proles of shools.
16
A mathing is a funtion µ : I → S ∪ s∅ suh that µ(i) = s and µ(i) = s
′
if only if s = s′. If
µ(i) = s∅ then student i is unassigned. In a mathing µ, the number of students assigned to a shool
s annot exeed the total number of available seats in shool s. Let M be the set of all possible
mathings.
A mehanism is a proedure whih selets a mathing for eah problem. That is, a mehanism
ϕ takes the preferene prole of the students, the priority order of students for shools, the quota
vetor, then selets a mathing for every problem. The mathing seleted by mehanism ϕ in problem
[I, S, q, P,≻] is denoted by ϕ [I, S, q, P,≻]. Let ϕ [I, S, q, P,≻] (i) denote the assignment of student
i ∈ I by mehanism ϕ for problem [I, S, q, P,≻].
Student i stritly prefers mathing µ to mathing µ′ if he stritly prefers µ(i) to µ′(i), µ(i)Piµ
′(i).
A mathing µ is Pareto eient if there does not exist a mathing µ′ ∈ M in whih eah student
is not worse o and at least one student is stritly better o. More formally, mathing µ is Pareto
eient if there does not exist a mathing µ′ ∈ M where µ′(i)Riµ(i) for eah i ∈ I and µ′(j)Pjµ(j)
at least for one j ∈ I. A mehanism ϕ is Pareto eient if for all problems it selets a Pareto eient
mathing.
A mehanism ϕ is strategy-proof if it is (weakly) dominant strategy for all students to tell their
preferenes truthfully. Formally, a mehanism ϕ is strategy-proof if for every preferene prole P
and P ′i ϕ [I, S, q, P,≻] (i)Riϕ [I, S, q, (P
′
i , P−i),≻] (i) for all student i ∈ I. Here, P−i represents the
true preferene prole of students exept i.
Let t≻i be the set of shools ranking i over all other students under priority prole ≻. Formally,
t≻i = {s ∈ S|i ≻s j ∀j ∈ I \ i}. A mehanism φ is mutually best if whenever there exists s ∈ t
≻
i suh
that sPis
′
for all s′ ∈ S \ {s} then φ [I, S, q, P, ≻] (i) = s for all i ∈ I.17
A mehanism φ is resoure monotoni if for all s ∈ S, all q′s ≤ qs either for all i ∈ I ,
φ [I, S, q, P,≻] (i)Ri φ [I, S, (q′s, q−s), P,≻] (i) or for all i ∈ I φ [I, S, (q
′
s, q−s), P,≻] (i)Riφ [I, S, q, P,≻] (i).
18
16
Shool distrits mostly use random tie breaking rules.
17
Morrill [2012℄ denes mutual best similarly.
18
See Thomson [2000℄, Ehlers and Klaus [2003℄ and Kesten [2009℄ for related results.
5
I use a dierent version of resoure monotoniity. Intuitively, if student i has the highest priority
for shool s then his welfare should not be worsened when the number of seats in shool s in-
reases. I formally dene resoure monotoniity for top-ranked students as follows: A mehanism
φ is resoure monotoni for top-ranked students if for all i ∈ I and all q′s ≥ qs > 0 where s ∈ t
≻
i
φ [I, S, (q′s, q−s), P,≻] (i)Riφ [I, S, q, P,≻] (i).
Before introduing our onsisteny axiom we need additional notation.
For any shool s ∈ S, priority order ≻s, and a set of students J ⊂ I, let ≻Js be the restrition of
priority order ≻s to students in J . Let ≻J= (≻Js )s∈S and ≻
−J= (≻I\Js )s∈S.
Given a problem [I, S, q, P,≻], a set of students J ⊂ I, and a quota prole q˜ ≤ q we say[
J, S, q˜, P−J ,≻
J
]
is the restrition of the problem [I, S, q, P,≻] to students in J and quota prole q˜.19
A mehanism is onsistent if whenever a set of students are removed with their assignments then
all the remaining students will be assigned to their initial assignment when we run the mehanism
only onsidering the remaining students and objets.
20
Formally, a mehanism φ is onsistent if for
any problem [I, S, q, P,≻], when we remove a set of students J ⊂ I together with their assignments
φ[I, S, q, P,≻](J), then for any i ∈ I \ J
φ[I \ J, S, q˜, P−J ,≻
−J ](i) = φ[I, J, q, P,≻](i)
where q˜s is the number of available seats remaining in shool s.
In this paper, we introdue a weaker version of the onsisteny axiom.
21
A mehanism satises
weak onsisteny if whenever we remove a set of students with their assignment suh that the student
with the highest priority for one of the removed student's assignment is also another removed student
then the assignments of the remaining students do not hange.
A mehanism φ is weakly onsistent if for any problem [I, S, q, P,≻], when we remove a set of
students J ⊂ I together with their assignments φ[I, S, q, P,≻](J) satisfying |t≻j ∩φ[I, S, q, P,≻](J)| =
1 for eah j ∈ J , then for any i ∈ I \ J
φ[I \ J, S, q˜, P−J ,≻
−J ](i) = φ[I, J, q, P,≻](i).
Our restrition on the set of students and seats removed is simple. It is easy to see that any
mehanism whih is onsistent based on the traditional denition satises the weaker form of it that
we dene here.
19
Similar notation is used in Sönmez and Ünver [2010℄.
20
See Thomson [1990℄ and Ergin [2000℄ for related results.
21
Sönmez and Ünver [2010℄ also modies the denition of the onsisteny axiom. In that paper, they haraterize
YRMH-IGYT in the house alloation problem with existing tenants. YRMH-IGYT also fails to satisfy the onsisteny
axiom but satises the modied version dened in that paper.
6
3 Top Trading Cyles Mehanism
In the shool hoie ontext, the TTC mehanism was rst introdued by Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez
[2003℄. It was based on the Gale's top trading yles algorithm [Shapley and Sarf, 1974℄. It is a
diret mehanism and for any given problem [I, S, q, P,≻] it works iteratively in a number of steps:
Top Trading Cyles Mehanism (TTC):
Step 1: Assign a ounter to eah shool and set it to the quota of eah shool. Eah student
points to his most preferred shool. Eah shool points to the top-ranked student in its priority order.
Shool s∅ points to all students pointing to it. Due to the niteness there is at least one yle.
22
Assign every student in the yles to the shool he points to and remove him. The ounter of eah
shool in a yle is redued by one and if it redues to zero, the shool is also removed.
In general,
Step k: Eah student points to his most preferred shool among the remaining ones. Eah
remaining shool points to the student with the highest priority among the remaining ones. Shool
s∅ points to all students pointing to it. There is at least one yle. Assign every student in the yles
to the shool he points to and remove him. The ounter of eah shool in a yle is redued by one
and if it redues to zero, the shool is also removed.
The algorithm terminates when all students are assigned.
We illustrate the dynamis of TTC mehanism in the following example.
Example 1 Let S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} , I = {i1, i2, i3, i4, i5} and q = (1, 1, 1, 2). The preferenes of
students and priorities are as follows:
i1 :s1Pi1s2Pi1s3Pi1s4 s1 :i5 ≻s1 i3 ≻s1 i4 ≻s1 i2 ≻s1 i1
i2 :s2Pi2s1Pi2s4Pi2s3 s2 :i3 ≻s2 i1 ≻s2 i4 ≻s2 i2 ≻s2 i1
i3 :s1Pi3s3Pi3s4Pi3s2 s3 :i3 ≻s3 i2 ≻s3 i4 ≻s3 i1 ≻s3 i5
i4 :s3Pi4s4Pi4s1Pi4s2 s4 :i1 ≻s4 i3 ≻s4 i2 ≻s4 i5 ≻s4 i4
i5 :s4Pi5s1Pi5s2Pi5s3
Step 1: Eah students points to his most preferred shool and eah shools points to the student
with the highest priority. There is only one yle: (s1, i5, s4, i1). We assign eah student in the yle
to the shool he points to and remove him: µ(i1) = s1 and µ(i5) = s4. We also redue the ounter of
eah shool in the yle and remove only s1 sine its ounter redues to zero.
Step 2: Eah remaining students points to his most preferred remaining shool and eah remaining
shools points to the student with the highest priority among the remaining ones. There is only
one yle: (s3, i3). We assign the student in the yle to the shool he points to and remove him:
22
A yle is an ordered list of distint shools and distint students (s1, i1, s2, ..., sk, ik) where s1 points to i1 , i1
points to s2 , ... , sk points to ik , ik points to s1 .
7
µ(i3) = s1. We also redue the ounter of the shool in the yle and remove it, s3, sine its ounter
redues to zero.
Step 3: Eah remaining students points to his most preferred remaining shool and eah remaining
shools points to the student with the highest priority among the remaining ones. There is only one
yle: (s2, i4, s4, i2). We assign eah students in the yle to the shool he points to and remove him:
µ(i2) = s2 and µ(i4) = s4. We also redue the ounter of eah shool in the yle and remove only
both of them sine their ounter redue to zero.
The mehanism terminates sine all students are assigned.
4 Results
In the following theorem, we show that TTC is Pareto eient, strategy-proof, weakly onsistent,
resoure monotoni for top-ranked students and mutually best. Moreover, there does not exist
another mehanism satisfying all these axioms. We prove it in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 In shool hoie problem TTC is the unique mehanism satisfying
• Pareto eieny
• Strategy-proofness
• Weak onsisteny
• Resoure monotoniity for top-ranked students
• Mutual best.
In the next setion, we show that there always exist another mehanism satisfying only four of
the ve axioms.
Mutual best an be onsidered as a very weak fairness requirement and satisfying it may not make
a mehanism more desirable. In the following proposition, we show that TTC mehanism satises
muh stronger fairness requirement.
Proposition 1 Under TTC mehanism, eah student weakly prefers his assignment to eah shool
s for whih he is ranked at the top qs portion of that shool's priority order.
Proof. Suppose not. Let student i's rank for shool s be r < qs and he be assigned to shool s
′
suh that sPis
′
. Shool s will start pointing student i after r−1 students are assigned to it if i is not
assigned in an earlier step. First onsider the ase that i is not assigned before s points him. Shool
8
s will keep pointing i until he is removed. Therefore, i will be assigned to s whenever he points to
that shool. Now onsider the ase that i is assigned before s points to him. In this ase, i should
be assigned to a better shool and he never points to s.
We an also show that TTC mehanism satises a general form of resoure monotoniity for
top-ranked student.
Proposition 2 When the number of available seats in shool s is inreased from qs to q˜s, keeping
everything else the same, then TTC mehanism assigns top qs students in shool s's priority order
to weakly better shools.
Proof. We refer to the proof of Theorem 1. The part that we prove TTC mehanism is resoure
monotoni for top-ranked students an be extended for top qs students. It follows from the fat that
the rst q ≤ qs seats of shool s annot be lled before top q students in shool s's priority order are
removed.
So far, we show that TTC mehanism outperforms other strategy-proof and Pareto eient
mehanisms. Some shool distrits onsider fairness as the most important onern and these distrits
selet DA mehanism instead of the TTC mehanism. In the rest of this setion, we fous on the
fairness and the performane of the TTC in terms of respeting priorities.
In the most of the shool distrits, priority struture is determined based on some exogenous rules.
For instane, Boston shool distrit gives the highest priority for a shool to the students living in the
same walk zone and having a sibling attending that shool.
23
The seond priority is given to students
having a sibling attending that shool but living outside the walk zone of that shool. Students who
are only living in the same walk zone have the third priority and the fourth priority is given to the
remaining students. Ties between students in the same priority group is broken by random lottery.
That is, the priority struture, ≻, in any problem is determined based on the priority groups and
random draw. Publi poliy makers and families might give more importane respeting priorities in
the upper priority groups [Abdulkadiro§lu, 2011℄. In Proposition 3, we show that TTC is suessful
at respeting priorities in the upper priority groups under some realisti onditions. Before presenting
our results we need some notation.
Suppose there are n priority groups and respeting priorities in the rst n∗ priority group is more
important. Let Gi : S → N be a funtion and Gi(s) be the priority group that student i belongs
to for shool s. We say student i's preferene Pi is perfetly orrelated with the priority groups
if the following ondition holds: if Gi(s) < n
∗
and Gi(s) < Gi(s
′) then sPis
′
. A preferene prole
23
This priority group is known as sibling-walk zone priority.
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P = (Pi)i∈I is perfetly orrelated with the priority groups if eah student's preferene is perfetly
orrelated with the priority groups. As an example, suppose the rst priority group (sibling-walk
zone) in Boston is given more importane than the others. Then the preferene prole of the students
is perfetly orrelated with the priority groups if eah student having sibling-walk zone priority in
some shool ranks one of the shools for whih he has sibling-walk zone priority at the top of his
preferene list.
Now we are ready to present our result on the performane of the TTC mehanism in terms of
respeting priorities.
Proposition 3 Let pi be the outome of TTC mehanism in problem [I, S, q, P,≻]. There does not
exist a student and shool pair (i, s) suh that Gi(s) < n
∗
, sPipi(i), there exists another student j
assigned to s and i ≻s j if any one of the following onditions holds:
(a) The total number of students in the rst n∗ priority lass of eah shool s is less than or equal
to qs.
(b) Preferene prole P is perfetly orrelated with the priority groups.
5 Independene of Axioms
Below we show the independene of axioms mentioned in Theorem 1.
• Strategy-proof, weakly onsistent, resoure monotoni for top-ranked students, and mutually
best, but not Pareto eient: Consider the following problem. Two shools S = {a, b} with
one available seat and two students I = {1, 2}. Let the preferene prole P and priority order
≻ be
P1 P2
b a
a b
s∅ s∅
≻a ≻b
1 2
2 1
Let mehanism ψ assign 2 to b and 1 to a. Let ψ selet the same assignment in the above
problem independent of preferenes. For all other problems, ψ selets the same mathing as
TTC mehanism. Mehanism ψ fails to be Pareto eient and satises other 4 properties.
• Strategy-proof, weakly onsistent, resoure monotoni for top-ranked students, and Pareto e-
ient, but not mutually best: Serial ditatorship mehanism is strategy-proof, (weakly) onsis-
tent, and Pareto-eient. Moreover, when the number of available seats in a shool is inrease
all students' welfare weakly improve. That is, it satises more generalized version of the re-
soure monotoniity for top-ranked students. However, it fails to be mutually best.
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• Strategy-proof, weakly onsistent, Pareto eient, and mutual best mehanism, but not resoure
monotoni for top-ranked students: Consider the following problem: Two shools S = {a, b}
with one available seat and three students I = {1, 2, 3}. Let the preferene prole P and
priority order ≻ be
P1 P2 P3
b b a
a a b
s∅ s∅ s∅
≻a ≻b
1 3
2 1
3 2
Let mehanism ψ assign 3 to a and 1 to b in this problem. If the number of available seats
in shool a is inreased to 2 then ψ assigns 1 and 3 to a and 2 to b. Let ψ selet the same
assignment in the above problem where a has two available seats and 1 ranks a above s∅ and
assign 1 to s∅ if he ranks a below s∅. For all other problems ψ selets the same mathing as
TTC mehanism. Mehanism ψ fails to be resoure monotoni for top-ranked students and
satises other 4 properties.
• Strategy-proof, Pareto eient, mutually best mehanism, resoure monotoni for top-ranked
students but not weakly onsistent: Consider the following problem. Three shools S = {a, b, c}
with one available seat and three students I = {1, 2, 3}. Let the preferene prole P and
priority order ≻ be
P1 P2 P3
c a a
a b b
b c c
≻a ≻b ≻c
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
Let mehanism ψ assign 1 to c and 2 to b and 3 to a in this problem. Let ψ selet the same
mathing as long as 1 and 3 submit the same preferenes and 2 ranks b over s∅. If we remove
1 with his assignment then 2 is assigned to a and 3 is assigned to b. For all other problems ψ
selets the same mathing as TTC mehanism. Mehanism ψ fails to be onsistent and satises
other 4 properties.
• Pareto eient, mutually best mehanism, resoure monotoni for top priority students and
onsistent but not strategy-proof: The Boston mehanism is Pareto eient, resoure monotoni
and onsistent [Kojima and Ünver, 2010℄. Moreover, in the rst step of the Boston mehanism
when a student applies to his most popular shool for whih he has the highest priority he will
be assigned to that shool. Therefore it satises mutual best. The Boston mehanism fails to
be strategy-proof (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 2003) and satises other 4 properties.
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6 Conlusion
TTC mehanism has been studied extensively in the market design literature. It and its variants
have been proposed as one of the best alternatives in many mathing markets inluding publi shool
hoie systems, on-ampus housing and the kidney exhange programs. However, TTC mehanism
has never been haraterized for the ases where objets have a apaity greater than one, i.e. shool
hoie problem. In this paper, we provide the rst haraterization of the TTC mehanism in the
shool hoie problem. Our haraterization will help the shool distrits hoose between strategy-
proof and Pareto eient mehanisms. In partiular, TTC mehanism is the unique strategy-proof
and Pareto eient mehanism satisfying mutual best, weak onsisteny and resoure monotoniity
for top-ranked students.
We also fous on the performane of the TTC mehanism in terms of respeting priorities. We
show that TTC mehanism respets priorities in the upper priority lasses. If the poliy makers
and families are only sensitive for the priority violations in the upper priority lasses then TTC
mehanism will meet their needs.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
We rst show that the TTC mehanism satises all of the axioms in the theorem. Then, we show
that it is the unique mehanism satisfying all of the axioms. Pareto eieny and strategy-proofness
of TTC follows from Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez [2003℄.
Mutual Best: Suppose TTC does not satisfy mutual best. Then, there exists a student shool
pair, (i, s), suh that student i has the highest priority for shool s and prefers shool s to any other
shool and i is not assigned to s by TTC. In the rst step of the TTC, s will point to i and i will
point to s. They will form a yle and i will be assigned to s. Therefore, TTC satises mutual best.
Resoure Monotoniity: To show that TTC is resoure monotoni for top-ranked students
take a student shool pair (i, s) suh that s ∈ t≻i and qs > 0. Denote the assignment of TTC in
problem [I, S, q, P,≻] with µ. Now onsider the problem [I, S, (q˜s, q−s), P,≻] where q˜s > qs. We
onsider a variant of the TTC mehanism in whih only one yle is removed in eah step.
24
Fix the
yle seletion rule. In partiular, let Cy(k) be the yle that is seleted in the kth step of the variant
of the TTC mehanism when we onsider the problem [I, S, q, P,≻]. Let s be removed in step k of
TTC when we onsider problem [I, S, q, P,≻]. We will also selet Cy(k˜) in step k˜ < k if we observe
that yle when we run the variant of TTC for the problem [I, S, (q˜s, q−s), P,≻].
24
TTC is independent of the order in whih yles are seleted.
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Shool s annot be removed before student i is assigned to a shool in problem [I, S, q, P,≻].
Therefore, i is assigned in step k′ ≤ k in the problem [I, S, q, P,≻]. To see this reall that in the
TTC mehanism, s will point to i until i is removed. Therefore, none of the seats of s will be assigned
to any student before i is removed. Also note that all the yles seleted in step k′′ < k′ in problem
[I, S, q, P,≻] will be observed in step k′′ of TTC when we onsider the problem [I, S, (q˜s, q−s), P,≻]
beause none of them inludes a student pointing to s and an inrease in the number of available
seats in s will not aet their assignments. As a result the set of remaining shools in step k′ of the
TTC mehanism in both problem will be the same and we will observe the yle inluding i in both
problems.
Weak Consisteny: We again onsider the variant of the TTC that is dened above. Let J
be the set of students and let µ(J) be their assignments. Due to the requirement in the denition
of the weak onsisteny we only hek the ase in whih eah student in J has the highest priority
for one of the shools in µ(J). Suppose none of the students in J belongs to a Cy(k) where k < k˜.
Then, it is lear that the assignment of students in Cy(k) where k < k˜ will not be aeted by the
removal of students in J with their assignments. Suppose i ∈ Cy(k˜). Let µ(i) be his assignment.
Therefore, i1 who is the top-ranked student in the priority order of µ(i) should be in J . This is also
true for the top-ranked student of the shool that i1 is assigned. Due to the niteness we should
have a yle. That is, Cy(k˜) ⊆ J and µ(Cy(k˜)) ⊆ µ(J). Therefore, removing these students before
running the TTC mehanism or removing them within the mehanism will not aet the assignments
of the remaining students.
Uniqueness: Suppose there exists another mehanism φ satisfying all these 5 properties and
there exists a problem [I, S, q, P, ≻] in whih φ and TTC selet dierent mathings. We will
onsider the version of TTC mehanism in whih only one yle is removed in a step and if there
are more than 1 yle the one whih will be removed is seleted based on some exogenous rule, i.e.
the yle with the shool having the lowest index . Then suppose that eah student removed before
step k ≥ 1 of the TTC mehanism is assigned to the same shool under φ and TTC. Denote these
students with set J . Let i be the student who is removed in the step k of TTC and assigned to a
dierent shool by φ. If we remove students assigned in the rst step of TTC with their assignments
then assignments of the remaining students in the outome of both mehanisms will not hange due
to the weak onsisteny. We an ontinue removing all students in J with their assignments and
still remaining students will be assigned to the same shools.
25
Denote the redued problem with[
I˜ , S˜, q˜, P˜ , ≻˜
]
. Here, I˜ = I \ J , S˜ = S, q˜s = −
∑
i∈J
1(φ[q, P,≻](i) = s) + qs, P˜ = PI˜ and ≻˜ =≻
I˜
. In
this redued problem student i will be removed in the rst step of the TTC mehanism. Let s be
the shool pointing student i in the rst step of TTC mehanism in the redued problem. By the
25
Here we remove students in the following order: Cy(2)− Cy(3)− ...− Cy(k − 2)− Cy(k − 1).
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denition of the TTC mehanism student i should be the top-ranked student in ≻˜s. We onsider
two ases. In the rst ase student i is assigned to s and in the seond ase i is assigned to another
shool by TTC.
Case 1: Student i points to the shool s in the rst step of TTC. Shool s should be the most
preferred shool in Pi among the ones having available seats. Suppose i reports P
′
i : sP
′
is∅. Due to
the strategy-proofness TTC will assign i to s and φ will assign to s∅. Any mutual best mehanism
should assign i to s in the redued problem. Therefore, φ fails to satisfy mutual best.
Case 2: In this ase i is assigned to s′ 6= s and there is another student j assigned to shool s.
Now suppose student i reports s′P ′isP
′
is∅. TTC will selet the same mathing. Due to the strategy-
proofness φ will assign i to either s where he is top-ranked or s∅.
26
First onsider the latter ase
in whih i is assigned to s∅ by φ when he submits s
′P ′isP
′
is∅. Now onsider the ase that i submits
sP ′′i s∅ and keeping everything same. Due to the strategy-proofness he will be assigned to s∅ by φ.
However this will violate mutual best. Therefore the latter ase is not possible. Therefore, when i
submits P ′i he will be assigned to s by φ. Now onsider the ase where i submits P
′
i and q˜s = 1.
Sine φ is resoure monotoni for top-ranked students, i annot be assigned to his top hoie s′ by
φ. Then he will be assigned to s or s∅. Due to the aforementioned reasons he will be assigned to s.
Therefore student j who is assigned to s by TTC will be assigned to an other shool by φ. Given s
is the top hoie of j among the shools with available seats j prefers his assignment under TTC to
φ.
Note that sine student j is assigned to a shool by TTC in the rst step there should be another
shool s′′ where j is the top-ranked student. If we repeat the same steps for student j then we will
show that when q˜s′′ = 1 and j submits sP
′
js
′′P ′js∅ he will be assigned to s
′′
by φ. We an keep
ontinue and show that φ will assign all the students who are assigned in the rst step of TTC to
one of the shools pointing to them in the rst step of TTC in the redued problem. Therefore
they will be assigned to stritly worse shool by φ and no other student will be assigned to those
shools sine all shools quota will be equalized to 1 when we keep repeating. Therefore a trade
between these students will inrease the welfare without worsening any other student and φ fails to
be Pareto-eient.
Proof of Proposition 3. Part (a) of the proposition is a diret result of Proposition 2. We
prove Part (b) by using the denition of the TTC mehanism. In partiular, we use the variant of
TTC mehanism in whih only one yle is removed in eah step (see Proof of Theorem1). Consider
the students who are ranked at the top of the priority order of shools. Then among these students
26
Here, it is possible that i an be also assigned to another shool that he doesn't inlude to his preferene list.
However, we an prove that this will violate either strategy-proofness of mutual best as a similar way that we follow
for showing that i annot be assigned to s∅.
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nd the students who are pointed by shools that they belong to the kth priority group and there
does not exist a student pointed by a shool that he belongs to the lth priority group where l < k.
If k > n∗ then we are done. If k ≤ n∗ then among these students, selet the one who is favored
in the random draw and denote him by i1. We laim that in this step, i1 is pointed by his most
popular shool. Suppose not. Then he is pointed by another shool s and his most popular shool s′
is pointing another student i′. Given s′Pi1s then Gi1(s) ≥ Gi1(s
′). Moreover, Gi1(s
′) = k > Gi′(s
′)
sine i1 is the most favored student in the random draw and i
′ ≻s′ i1. This ontradits with the
fat that there does not exist a student pointed by a shool that he belongs to the lth priority group
where l < k. Then student i1's priority is not violated in any shool beause he is assigned to his
most popular shool.
We show in Theorem 1 that TTC mehanism satises weak onsisteny. That is, when we remove
i1 with his assignment the remaining students will be assigned to the same shool by TTC mehanism
in the updated problem. Therefore, we an onsider the redued problem as a new problem and
repeat the steps above and show that there does not exist a student and shool pair (i, s) suh that
Gi(s) < n
∗
, sPipi(i), there exists another student j assigned to s and i ≻s j.
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